

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

APEX - One System for Industry

FRC	(C)	EXTENSION	NO.
Chief, Policy and Plans Group 4E-70, Hdqs.			DATE 30 JUN 1980

STAT
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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

1.	DD/PSI 4E-58, Hdqs.			
2.	DD/P&M 4E-60, Hdqs.			
3.	DD/CA 3D-39, Hdqs.			
4.	DD/PTOS [Redacted]	1 JUL 1980		Offen
5.	DD/PTOS		2 July	SI
6.	PPG			
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

For your review and comment by
3 July 1980.

Joe - I don't like this at all! It has all the flavor of laying the foundation for an excuse of APEX find with CIA the preordained scapegoat. The next step is one single security investigative/education agency for the IC.

An interesting suggestion (to me) would have the DCI request ISBr/audit a select few community contractor facilities on an unannounced schedule to shed some light on how well current (or ApeX) policy is being met.

Essentially my concern is not how well CIA is doing - But the rest of the community. I believe the time will come soon that CIA will have to operate outside SEI in order to afford adequate protection to special ops, programs, etc. Curt

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Special Assistant to the DCI for Compartmentation

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SUBJECT: APEX--One System for Industry

1. As APEX proceeds, I am convinced that the single most difficult task will be to assure that the U.S. Government does, in fact, deal with industry in accord with a single set of SCI rules. As previously noted, at least some industrial representatives are completely without faith in the Government's ability to act on one set of rules even though all agree that all parties, especially the taxpayer, would benefit significantly from uniform action.

*these goes
any concept
of "minimum"
standards -!*

2. I am concerned that, even within CIA, not all senior managers recognize what is involved in creating a uniform Government-wide process for dealing with SCI and industry. For example, one system means

← CIA acceptance of:

- Navy background investigations
- Army physical inspection of SCI facilities
(IF NEED TO KNOW EXISTS)
- DoD adjudications of security investigations?
- NSA-granted exceptions to ^{the} two-person rule
- Air Force periodic security examination of physical and procedural affairs

I meet DCID 1/14
*elaborating
presumes everything
is static and no
change in utilization
environment etc.*

*not on
Agency
Programs*

*Working Paper
Illustration 1 Jan 1983*

Conf

- Nondisclosure Agreement executed under NSA aegis
- SAFSS indoctrination for access to a particular system
- Department of Energy certification for a particular product access

3. We have an approved APEX Security Policy Manual for Industry; DIA is drafting a large and detailed implementation manual, which I intend to review before publication. Once both are issued, I propose to require that all U.S. parties are bound by the two publications; that is, CIA must abide by the added detail in the DoD implementing procedures.

4. I believe that more effort is necessary to assure that all hands recognize what is involved throughout the Community and that CIA must be as pure as IVORY in this context.

5. A part of the problem in operating a single system is alleged by some to lie in DCIDs, especially 1/14 and 1/16, and in the NFIB policy on physical security. Some say the problem is that they are not sufficiently specific and detailed. Others say that they are misinterpreted in accord with local circumstances--frequently having to do with resource limitations. Another concern is "poly" or "no poly" for contractors. DCIDs are a separate problem, bearing heavily upon the creation of a single SCI system, but they are not proposed as a topic of this discussion.

6. I request, consequently, that I speak, in the presence of you and Mr. Carlucci, to the Deputy Directors, augmented by the Directors

*Want CIA Security
at a shot at it?*

*Of course - most
of Community
doesn't abide
with DCIDs -
re-look at
instructional
standards +
criteria*

*How
about
D/S
approval?*

*Is the
Driving
Force for
DOD*

*Why?
NLI
Essential*

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of Security, Logistics, perhaps Directors of OD&E, NPIC and OSO, Ev Hineman, as CIA SIO, and whomever else you suggest on this problem. A DCI Staff Meeting might be appropriate, even if it did not ^{include} ~~contain~~ some of the listed office directors. I would take perhaps ten minutes.

7. After CIA's house is very clearly in order, a presentation probably should be made at NFIB, but a recommendation to that end should await assurance of clear perceptions by CIA officials. As I understand the reality, CIA and NSA are regarded by the rest of the Community as the principal creators of difficulties in that both impose what others consider extra-DCID standards on contractors. This memorandum was coordinated with Directors of Security, Logistics and Office of Development and Engineering.

8.

STA